The situation in DPRK: global security and nuclear non-proliferation

Moscow Model United Nations RSUH 2010

SECURITY COUNCIL

 
 
 

The situation in DPRK: global security and nuclear non-proliferation 
 

Report by the Experts

Khrapov Alexander

Loseva Daria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Moscow 2010

CONTENTS:

 

1. Introduction………………………………………………………………….3
2. Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty ……………………………………….......9
3. North Korean missile and nuclear tests ……………………………………13
4. Security Council’s resolutions on DPRK nuclear tests ……………………18
5. International talks on DPRK nuclear program ………………………….....21
6. Perspectives of denuclearization of Korean peninsula….……………….....29
7. Documents recommended……………………………………………….…30

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Introduction

     Korea has been a divided country since 1945, when it was liberated from the defeated Japan after World War II. The Korean War was fought from June 25, 1950, until a ceasefire was signed on July 27, 1953. However, since North Korea and South Korea have still not officially made peace, strictly speaking, the war has yet to officially end.

     Tensions between North and South have run high on numerous occasions since 1953. The deployment of the US Army’s Second Infantry Division on the Korean peninsula and the American military presence at the Korean Demilitarized Zone are publicly regarded by North Korea as an occupying army. In several areas, North Korean and American/South Korean forces operate in extreme proximity to the border, adding to tension. This tension led to the border clash in 1976, which has become known as the Axe Murder Incident.

     According to newly declassified documents from the archives of former communist allies of North Korea, Pyongyang first began to pursue nuclear technology as early as 1956. In the early 1960s security concerns in the region and an apparent Soviet dismissal of these concerns hastened the DPRK's efforts to acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons. In the wake of the student-led April 19 movement in 1960 that overthrew Rhee Syngman and the May 16, 1961 military coup d'état that brought General Park Chung-hee to power, North Korea sought a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union and China.

     Yet, Soviet leaders reportedly did not even consider such a pact necessary, despite the military posture of the anti-communist Park Jung-hee regime, as long as the Soviets improved relations with the United States.

     Perhaps the two most important factors in North Korea's attempts to obtain nuclear weapons and become militarily self-reliant were the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and the prospect of a US–Japan–ROK alliance following the 1965 establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and Japan. Kim Il Sung reportedly did not trust that the Soviets would live up to the conditions of the mutual defense pact and guarantee North Korea's security since they betrayed Castro by withdrawing nuclear missiles in an effort to improve relations with the United States. As a North Korean official explained to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1965, "the Korean leaders were distrustful of the CPSU and the Soviet government, they could not count on that the Soviet government would keep the obligations related to the defense of Korea it assumed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Kim Il Sung said, and therefore they were compelled to keep an army of 700,000 and a police force of 200,000." In explaining the cause of such mistrust, the official claimed that "the Soviet Union had betrayed Cuba at the time of the Caribbean crisis." However, as recently declassified Russian, Hungarian, and East German materials confirm, no communist governments were willing to share the technology with the North Koreans, out of fear that they would share the technology with China.

     With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korean leaders recognized the need for a new security relationship with a major power since Pyongyang could not afford to maintain its military posture. North Korean leaders therefore sought to forge a new relationship with the United States, the only power strong enough to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the early 1990s, throughout the first nuclear crisis, North Korea sought a non-aggression pact with the United States.

     The U.S. rejected North Korean calls for bilateral talks concerning a non-aggression pact, and stated that only six-party talks that also include the People’s Republic of China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea are acceptable. The American stance was that North Korea had violated prior bilateral agreements, thus such forums lacked accountability. Conversely, North Korea refused to speak in the context of six-party talks, stating that it would only accept bilateral talks with the United States. This led to a diplomatic stalemate.

     On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time. Both the United States Geological Survey and Japanese seismological authorities detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.2 in North Korea, corroborating some aspects of the North Korean claims.

     On November 19, 2006 North Korea's Minju Joson newspaper accused South Korea of building up arms in order to attack the country, claiming that "the South Korean military is openly clamoring that the development and introduction of new weapons are to target the North." Pyongyang accused South Korea of conspiring with the United States to attack the isolated and impoverished state, an accusation made frequently by the North and routinely denied by the U.S.

     On May 25, 2009 North Korea conducted a second test of a nuclear weapon at the same location as the original test (not confirmed). The test weapon was of the same magnitude as the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in the 2nd World War, (confirmed S. Korea and Russia). At the same time of the test N. Korea tested 2 short range missiles (reported a S. Korean News Network YTN – not officially confirmed).

     North Korea has a history of poor relations with western-friendly neighboring countries. During the 1970s and 1980s, North Korean abductions of Japanese and South Koreans occurred. Although having since partly resolved the issue by admitting its role in the abductions, it remains a contentious issue with the two countries. In addition, the United States accuses North Korea of producing large numbers of high-quality counterfeit U.S. bills. However, South Korea has maintained a Sunshine policy towards North Korea since the 1990s, stressing Korean reunification and thus often going to great lengths to avoid antagonizing the leadership of the country. This policy ended in 2009.

     Since the late 1980s, North Korea's nuclear program has become a pressing issue in international affairs. After allegations from the United States about the continued existence of a military nuclear program in defiance of the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea allegedly admitted to the existence of uranium enrichment activities during a private meeting with American military officials. Afterwards, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty on January 10, 2003. After insisting on bilateral negotiations with the United States, it agreed to six-party talks between itself, the United States, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan in August 2003. The talks continued for two years until an agreement was reached on September 19, 2005, which was placed under severe strain by the subsequent nuclear test by North Korea in October 2006. Since then, a very similar agreement was reached on February 13, 2007, that includes normalizing US-North Korean and Japanese-North Korean diplomatic ties on the condition that North Korea freeze its Yongbyon nuclear facility.

     After 1945, the Soviet Union supplied the economic and military aid that enabled North Korea to mount its invasion of the South in 1950. Soviet aid and influence continued at a high level during the Korean war; as mentioned, the Soviet Union was largely responsible for rebuilding North Korea's economy after the cessation of hostilities. In addition, the assistance of Chinese volunteers during the war and the presence of these troops until 1958 gave China some degree of influence in North Korea. In 1961, North Korea concluded formal mutual security treaties with the Soviet Union (inherited by Russia) and China, which have not been formally ended. For most of the Cold War, North Korea followed a policy of equidistance between the Soviet Union and China by accepting favors from both while avoiding a clear preference for either.

     In the 1970s and early 1980s, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan created strains between China and the Soviet Union and, in turn, in North Korea's relations with its two major communist allies. North Korea tried to avoid becoming embroiled in the Sino-Soviet split, obtaining aid from both the Soviet Union and China and trying to avoid dependence on either. Following Kim Il Sung's 1984 visit to Moscow, there was a dramatic improvement in Soviet-DPRK relations, resulting in renewed deliveries of advanced Soviet weaponry to North Korea and increases in economic aid.

     South Korea established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and the People's Republic of China in 1992, which put a serious strain on relations between North Korea and its traditional allies. Moreover, the fall of communism in eastern Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 had resulted in a significant drop in communist aid to North Korea, resulting in largely decreased relations with Russia. Despite these changes and its past reliance on this military and economic assistance, North Korea proclaims a militantly independent stance in its foreign policy in accordance with its official ideology of Juche, or self-reliance.

     At the same time, North Korea maintains membership in a variety of multilateral organizations. It became a member of the United Nations in September 1991. North Korea also belongs to the Food and Agriculture Organization; the International Civil Aviation Organization; the International Postal Union; the UN Conference on Trade and Development; the ITU; the UN Development Programme; the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the World Health Organization; the World Intellectual Property Organization; the World Meteorological Organization; the International Maritime Organization; the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Non-Aligned Movement.

     In July 2000, North Korea began participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun attended the ARF ministerial meeting in Bangkok July 26–27. The DPRK also expanded its bilateral diplomatic ties in that year, establishing diplomatic relations with Italy, Australia, and the Philippines. The United Kingdom established diplomatic relations with the DPRK on December 13, 2000, as did Canada in February, 2001 followed by Germany and New Zealand on March 1, 2001. Mexico maintains diplomatic relations with North Korea. Other countries such as France, the United States, and South American nations do not have formal diplomatic ties with North Korea and have not announced any intention to have any. North Korea, however, maintains a delegation, not an embassy, near Paris.

     Steps have been taken to normalize US and Japanese ties since the landmark February 13, 2007 agreement reached, in exchange for North Korea freezing its nuclear facility at Yongbyon.

     North Korea fired short-range missiles off its western coast March 28, 2008, told a South Korean defense source. South Korea's presidential office dismissed reports of the missile launches as part of "ordinary military training" by the communist state. On March 27, 2008, the Seoul-government pulled 11 of its diplomats from an industrial park the two countries operate in North Korea. Their departure followed comments made in the week of March 17, 2008 by South Korean Unification Minister Kim Ha-joong. He said it would be hard to expand the industrial complex without North Korean progress on denuclearization.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

 

     The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT or NNPT) is a treaty to limit the spread (proliferation) of nuclear weapons. The treaty came into force on 5 March 1970, and currently there are 189 states party to the treaty, five of which are recognized as nuclear weapon states: the United States, Russia , the United Kingdom, France, and China.

     Treaty declares only states invented and tested nuclear weapons or devices until 1 January 1967 are recognized as nuclear weapon states.

     Four non-parties to the treaty are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons, while Israel has had a policy of opacity regarding its own nuclear weapons program. North Korea acceded to the treaty, violated it, and in 2003 withdrew from it.

     The treaty was proposed by Ireland and Finland, and they were the first to sign.

   The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Although the concept of "pillars" is not expressed anywhere in the NPT, the treaty is nevertheless sometimes interpreted as a three-pillar system, with an implicit balance among them:

1. non-proliferation,
2. disarment, and
3. the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.

   First pillar: non-proliferation

     Five states are recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear weapon states (NWS). These five NWS agree not to transfer "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce" a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) to acquire nuclear weapons (Article I). NNWS parties to the NPT agree not to "receive," "manufacture" or "acquire" nuclear weapons or to "seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons" (Article II). NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Article III).

     The five NWS parties have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-NWS party except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in alliance with a Nuclear Weapons State. However, these undertakings have not been incorporated formally into the treaty, and the exact details have varied over time. The U.S. also had nuclear warheads targeted at North Korea, a non-NWS state, from 1959 until 1991.

     Second pillar: disarmament

     The NPT's preamble contains language affirming the desire of treaty signatories to ease international tension and strengthen international trust so as to create someday the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons, and treaty on general and complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from national arsenals.

     The wording of the NPT's Article VI arguably imposes only a vague obligation on all NPT signatories to move in the general direction of nuclear and total disarmament, saying, "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament." Under this interpretation, Article VI does not strictly require all signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty. Rather, it only requires them "to negotiate in good faith."

     On the other hand, some governments, especially non-nuclear-weapon states belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, have interpreted Article VI's language as being anything but vague. In their view, Article VI constitutes a formal and specific obligation on the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, and argue that these states have failed to meet their obligation. Some government delegations to the Conference on Disarmament have put forth proposals for a complete and universal disarmament, but no disarmament treaty has emerged from these proposals. Critics of the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states sometimes argue that what they view as the failure of the NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, especially in the post-Cold War era, has angered some non-nuclear-weapon NPT signatories of the NPT. Such failure, these critics add, provides justification for the non-nuclear-weapon signatories to quit the NPT and develop their own nuclear arsenals.

     Other observers have suggested that the linkage between proliferation and disarmament may also work the other way, i.e., that the failure to resolve proliferation threats in Iran and North Korea, for instance, will cripple the prospects for disarmament. No current nuclear weapons state, the argument goes, would seriously consider eliminating its last nuclear weapons without high confidence that other countries would not acquire them. Some observers have even suggested that the very progress of disarmament by the superpowers—which has led to the elimination of thousands of weapons and delivery systems —could eventually make the possession of nuclear weapons more attractive by increasing the perceived strategic value of a small arsenal. As one U.S. official and NPT expert warned in 2007, "logic suggests that as the number of nuclear weapons decreases, the 'marginal utility' of a nuclear weapon as an instrument of military power increases. At the extreme, which it is precisely disarmament’s hope to create, the strategic utility of even one or two nuclear weapons would be huge."

     Third pillar: peaceful use of nuclear energy

     The third pillar allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to NPT signatory countries for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs in those countries, as long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons.

Since very few of the states with nuclear energy programs are willing to abandon the use of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the NPT under Article IV provides other states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons.

     The treaty recognizes the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but restricts this right for NPT parties to be exercised "in conformity with Articles I and II" (the basic nonproliferation obligations that constitute the "first pillar" of the Treaty).

     Countries that have signed the treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States and maintained that status have an unbroken record of not building nuclear weapons. However, Iraq was cited by the IAEA and sanctioned by the UN Security Council for violating its NPT safeguards obligations; North Korea never came into compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and was cited repeatedly for these violations, and later withdrew from the NPT and tested multiple nuclear devices; Iran was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in an unusual non-consensus decision because it "failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time" to report aspects of its enrichment program; and Libya pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program before abandoning it in December 2003. In 1991 Romania reported previously undeclared nuclear activities by the former regime and the IAEA reported this non-compliance to the Security Council for information only. In some regions, the fact that all neighbors are verifiably free of nuclear weapons reduces any pressure individual states might feel to build those weapons themselves, even if neighbors are known to have peaceful nuclear energy programs that might otherwise be suspicious. In this, the treaty works as designed.

 
 

North Korean missile and nuclear tests

 

   There have been a number of North Korean missile and nuclear tests. It has also fired a number of short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan, apparently as political gestures.

• 1993 missile test - (May 29/30, 1993) – Nodong-1

   The testing demonstrated that parts of western Japan were within the 1,000 km (600-mile) range of the missile, causing great anxiety. The North Koreans were testing the missile so they could export it to Iran in return for oil. Japanese and United States officials waited a few days before disclosing the launch of the missile. Afterwards, North Korea reaffirmed its commitment to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

   The missile launches were the culmination of several months' planning and bargaining with Iran, and what was suggested to be a plot between Iran and North Korea to develop weapons capable of striking Japan.

• 1998 missile test - (August 31, 1998) – Taepodong-1

   Preparations for the first satellite launch began at the Musudan-ri Launch Facility on August 7, 1998. Two weeks later, Korean People’s Navy vessels proceeded to their mission area into the Sea of Japan. By that time, South Korea had already placed two other satellites into space with Delta-7925 SLVs: Koreasat 1 and Koreasat 2, on August 5, 1995, and on January 14, 1996, respectively.

   The mission was planned with an initial evening launch window that was favorable for observation. After a weather forecast predicted heavy winds and rain on the evening of the first launch window in question, the decision was then taken to delay the launch until 12:07 when the weather had cleared.

   Liftoff occurred on August 31 at 12:07 local time. The first stage was separated from the rocket 95 seconds after the launch. The fairing shroud separated 144 seconds after the launch, then the second stage separated itself from the rocket 266 seconds after the launch. North Korea claimed that the third stage put the satellite into orbit 27 seconds after the separation of the second stage.

• 2006 missile test - (July 5, 2006) – Taepodong-2. Nodong-2 failed

   The missiles were launched from the Musudan-ri Missile Test Facility, and all of the missiles reportedly landed in the Sea of Japan, 500–600 kilometers west of the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido, in international waters about 100 kilometers south of the Russian cities of Vladivostok and Nakhodka. It was also reported that two missiles landed in Russian territorial waters. Only the Taepodong-2 was launched from Musudan-ri. The Scuds and Nodongs were launched from Gitdaeryung, Anbyun, and Kangwon-do.

   The United States State Department has said that the Taepodong-2 missile failed in mid-air after about 42 seconds of flight and probably continued for 2 minutes in total. The first missile was launched Wednesday, July 5 at 03:33 and the next two at 04:04 and 05:01 local time, respectively. The first launches came minutes before the successful launch of Space Shuttle Discovery in Florida. Some have speculated that the medium-range missile tests were used as decoys to divert attention from the Taepodong-2 missile. The range of the missile was often estimated to be 6000 km, capable of reaching as far as Alaska. However, analysts in South Korea often put the range at no more than 2,400 miles (or less than 4000 km), which, as far as U.S. interests are concerned, means the missile could reach Guam or possibly the sparsely inhabited western tip of the Aleutian Islands.

   East Asian stock markets were shaken by the launches, with investors expressing concerns that moves like this could lead to a future conflict in the Southeast and East Asian areas. Crude oil prices have also risen since the missile tests.

   Many experts believe that the timing, which was in the very early hours of July 5 in Korea, but midday of July 4th in the United States when space shuttle Discovery was about to lift off, was deliberate to get attention from the United States, and possibly an attempt for one on one talks rather than the six party talks regarding North Korea's nuclear capabilities.

• 2006 nuclear test (October 9, 2006)

   North Korea announced its intention to conduct a test on October 3, six days prior, and in doing so became the first nation to give warning of its first nuclear test. The blast is estimated to have had an explosive force of less than one kiloton, and some radioactive output was detected. United States officials suggested the device may have been a nuclear explosive that misfired.

   An anonymous official at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing told a South Korean newspaper that the explosive output was smaller than expected. Because of the secretive nature of North Korea and small yield of the test, there remains some question as to whether it was an unusually small successful test, or a partially failed "fizzle" or dud.

   It was reported that the government of the People's Republic of China was given a 20-minute advance warning that the test was about to occur. China sent an emergency alert to Washington, D.C. through the United States embassy in Beijing at which time President George W. Bush was told by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley "shortly after" 10 p.m. (UTC-5) that a test was imminent.

• 2009 satellite rocket launch - (April 5, 2009) – Unha-2

   The launch proceeded in relatively clear weather conditions. The launch pad was at the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground, in the North Korean province of North Hamgyong, near the northern tip of the East Korea Bay. The rocket flew over the Japanese islands "and reached airspace above the Pacific Ocean". North Korea stated the first stage of the rocket would fall in the sea 75 kilometres (47 mi) west of Japan, and the second stage would fall into the Pacific Ocean. Japanese authorities stated no reports of damage or injury in Japan as a result of the launch, and that the rocket's first stage "landed in the water as had been expected". According to the United States Northern Command, the remaining stages along with the payload itself landed in the Pacific Ocean.

• 2009 missile test (July 4, 2009)

   Two rounds of North Korean missile tests were conducted in July 2009. On July 4, 2009, the DPRK launched seven short range missiles into the Sea of Japan, after previously launching four missiles two days earlier. The missiles were launched in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874.

   Missiles have been fired from the launch site at the port of Wonsan on the east coast of the country. Based on information from an anonymous government representative in Seoul, Korean agency Yonhap reported that the missiles are of the Scud type with a range of around 400 kilometers.

   During the week North Korea announced upcoming military exercises in the Sea of Japan, and with it declared an area closed to navigation around the port of Vonsan and into the Sea of Japan and covering an area of 450 by 110 kilometers. The planned military exercises were announced to cover the period from June 25 to July 10.

   The latest round of missile launches were timed for the United States' Independence Day as a show of military might and came on the heels of UNSC Resolution 1874. Sanctions and penalties were declared in the wake of the May 25 underground test of a nuclear explosive device by Pyongyang, and what the DPRK insist was an attempt to peacefully place a satellite in orbit but what the United States, Japan and South Korea see as cover for the development of a long-range ballistic missile.

   The North Koreans have previously warned that any attempt to enact sanctions will be seen as an act of war.

• 2009 nuclear test 

   The 2009 North Korean nuclear test was the underground detonation of a nuclear device conducted on 25 May 2009 by North Korea.  Following the nuclear test, Pyongyang also conducted several missile tests.

   The test was nearly universally condemned by the international community. Following the test, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1874condemning the test and tightening sanctions on the country.

   It is widely believed that the test was conducted as a result of a succession crisis in the country. After Kim Jong-Il suffered a stroke in the summer of 2008, arrangements were made for his third son, Kim Jong-un, to take power upon his death. It is believed the North Koreans conducted the nuclear test to show that, even in a time of possible weakness, it did not intend to give up its nuclear weapons program.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Security Council’s resolutions on DPRK nuclear tests

 

     Security Council, whose mission is keeping peace in the world, is very concerned about situation in DPRK. It is watching closely over the DPRK’s actions and adopting resolutions that require DPRK to honour its non-proliferation obligations and fulfill the requirements of Security Councils.

 

First Security Council resolutions on DPRK 825 (1993), adopted on 11 May, called upon North Korea to reconsider withdrawing from the non-proliferation Treaty and to honour its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.

 

On 28 April, by its resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council decided that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. It decided also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. Security Council called upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery.

 

On 15 July 2006, Security Council adopted resolution 1695 (2006), by which it condemned the multiple launches by the DPRK of ballistic missiles on 5 July 2006 local time and demanded that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program, and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching. It also required all Member States to exercise vigilance and prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology being transferred to DPRK’s missile or WMD programs. Security Council strongly urged the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition and to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return at an early date to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

 

On 14 October 2006, Security Council, by its resolution 1718 (2006), condemned the nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK on 9 October 2006 in flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, including that such a test would bring universal condemnation of the international community and would represent a clear threat to international peace and security. It demanded that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile and that the DPRK return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Security Council decided to establish a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution.

 

On 12 June, Security Council adopted resolution 1874 (2009), by which it condemned in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions and calls upon the DPRK to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest date. It called upon all Member States not to provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other WMD-related programs or activities. It decided that the Committee should intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolution 1718 (2006), the statement of its President of 13 April

2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and this resolution.

Security Council requested the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year,

in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to seven experts (“Panel of

Experts”), acting under the direction of the Committee to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in resolution 1718 (2006) and to make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or Member States, may consider to improve implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution.

 

On 24 September, Security Council, by its resolution 1887 (2009), called upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations and fulfill their commitments under the Treaty and called upon all States that are not Parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date. It called upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament.

Security Council called upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion

and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

 

The latest Security Council resolution 1928 (2010), adopted on 7 June 2010, extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts that assists the DPRK Sanctions Committee until 12 June 2011.   

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

International talks on DPRK nuclear program

 

     The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was signed on October 21, 1994 between North Korea and the United States. The objective of the agreement was the freezing and replacement of North Korea's indigenous nuclear power plant program with more nuclear proliferation resistant light water reactor power plants,^[and the step-by-step normalization of relations between the U.S. and the DPRK. Implementation of the agreement was troubled from the start, but its key elements were being implemented until it effectively broke down in 2003.

   The main provisions of the agreement were:

• DPRK's graphite-moderated 5MWe nuclear reactor, and the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under construction, which could easily produce weapons grade plutonium, would be replaced with two 1000MW light water reactors power plants by a target date of 2003.
• Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down and construction halted, until completion of the first light water reactor power unit. The amount of oil was 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year.
• The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
• The U.S. would provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
• The DPRK would take steps to implement the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
• The DPRK would remain a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
• IAEA ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze.
• Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without reprocessing in the DPRK.
• Before delivery of key light water reactor nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

   Although the agreement had largely broken down, North Korea did not restart work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under the agreement. These plants could potentially have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yongbyon plutonium complex for eight years From 1994 to December, 2002.

   The Six-Party Talks were aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear program through a negotiating process involving China, the United States, North and South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Since the talks began in August 2003, the negotiations have been bedeviled by diplomatic standoffs among individual Six-Party member states--particularly between the United States and North Korea. In April 2009, North Korea quit the talks and announced that it would reverse the ongoing disablement process called for under the Six-Party agreements and restart its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Because Pyongyang appears intent on maintaining its nuclear program, some experts are pessimistic the talks can achieve anything beyond managing the North Korean threat. The Obama administration has been pursuing talks with the other four countries in the process to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiation table.

   The Six-Party Talks began in August 2003. Numerous rounds of negotiations resulted in a September 2005 agreement in which Pyongyang agreed to abandon its quest to become a nuclear power. The talks came after a policy reversal in the presidency of George W. Bush, who had initially ended the policy of direct engagement with Pyongyang endorsed by President Bill Clinton before him. Bush included North Korea in the "Axis of Evil" during his 2002 State of the Union address and, that October, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded that Pyongyang was pursuing a uranium-enrichment program. According to Washington, this violated the spirit of the 1994 Agreed Framework, in which the United States pledged to provide fuel oil and construct two light-water reactors while North Korea promised to end a plutonium enrichment program in exchange.

North Korea admitted to the uranium-enrichment program but refused to end it unless the United States agreed to hold bilateral talks and normalize relations. When Washington rebuffed these demands, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, forced International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to leave, and restarted its plutonium-enrichment program. With tensions mounting, including the March 2003 interception of a U.S. spy plane by North Korean fighter aircraft over the Sea of Japan, the United States, North Korea, and China held trilateral talks in Beijing in April 2003. These negotiations served as a prelude to the first round of Six-Party Talks, which brought other regional players--South Korea, Japan, and Russia--into the fold.

     According to the September 2005 pact, Pyongyang would eventually abandon its nuclear program, rejoin the NPT, and allow IAEA monitors to return. In exchange, North Korea would receive food and energy assistance from the other members. The statement also paved the way for Pyongyang to normalize relations with both the United States and Japan, and for the negotiation of a peace agreement for the Korean peninsula.

     However, negotiations hit a roadblock in November 2005 after the U.S. Treasury Department placed restrictions on Macao-based Banco Delta Asia, which Washington accused of laundering $25 million in North Korean funds. The Macanese government subsequently froze Pyongyang's roughly fifty accounts held in the bank. As the talks fell apart, North Korea stepped up its provocative behavior, conducting missile tests in July 2006 and a nuclear test in October 2006.

After the nuclear crisis came to a head, Beijing pressed North Korea to rejoin the talks. In February 2007, during the sixth round of talks, members hammered out a denuclearization plan--seen by Washington as a means to jump-start the September 2005 statement--involving a sixty-day deadline for North Korea to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for aid and the release of the Banco Delta Asia funds. The deal also involved a series of bilateral talks, including between North Korea and the United States.

     In July 2007, the denuclearization program gained momentum with Pyongyang shutting down its main plutonium-producing nuclear plant at Yongbyon. In October, Pyongyang agreed to end its nuclear program in exchange for aid and diplomatic concessions and started to disable the Yongbyon plant by removing eight thousand fuel rods from the nuclear reactor under the guidance of U.S. experts.

     In May 2008, North Korea handed over around eighteen thousand pages of documents to the United States detailing production records of its nuclear programs. This handover was followed by a declaration a month later, as agreed in the Six-Party Talks.  In June, it imploded the cooling tower of the Yongbyon nuclear plant and the Bush administration responded by removing restrictions on North Korea from the Trading with the Enemy Act. Following Pyongyang's agreement to some verification measures in October, Washington took North Korea off the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.