Тибетский вопрос

Contents

Annotation………………………………………………………………….………3

Introduction………………………………………………………….…………..4

1. Historical Background……………………………………………….……….6

    1. Political and ethnical Status Quo of Tibet……………………………………..6
    2. China’s View on the Issue…………………………………………………….7
    3. The CTA’s View on the Issue……………………………………………...…9

 

  1. Analysis the problem of Tibetan issue and  the  Chinese national policy in this  region……………………………………………………………………12

2.1. Seeing each other with Different ethno political approach…………………12

2.2. Religion Politics……………………………………………………………...15

2.3. Possible future of Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR)……………………17

 

Abbreviation List………………………………………………………………20

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...22

Bibliography………………………………………………………………….…23

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Annotation

           The China-Tibet conflict is often viewed as an ethnic and/or religious conflict. This is understandable, given the prominence of ethnicity and religion in the conflict. First, while the native inhabitants of the Tibetan plateau are Tibetans, the majority ethnic group in China is Han Chinese. The Chinese government is made up mostly of Han Chinese, and it does not have a strong record of dealing with China's ethnic minorities — like Tibetans — in a fair way. Secondly, virtually all Tibetans are Buddhists, while ethnic Han Chinese are generally not, even though the Chinese people are becoming increasingly religious — including Buddhist — now that the ideology of Communism has collapsed in China (except in name only). Moreover, the Chinese government has a history of persecuting religious movements, especially those which draw large numbers of followers and which have the potential to transform into political movements that could potentially threaten the regime's hold on power. Tibetan Buddhism has this kind of following and transformative potential. For these reasons, headlines from the Tibet conflict often paint a picture of intense religious and ethnic conflict.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

          This thesis is a problem based oriented one mainly within the field of international relations that explores the issue, and the problems it carries with it, or China and Tibet. It sets out to find possible answers, solutions and possible outcomes as to whether China and Tibet, as in the Exile Government of Tibet are able to reach a solution favourable to both parts. This is the essence of the problem formulation found in this report, and it is this question, of whether these two entities can agree on a solution, that guides the thesis throughout it and the purpose is to gain answers to this question. The case is that both entities have a different take on the history of Tibet and China. While Tibet claims that it does not belong to China, China claims that it does. This is the initial problem of the subject matter that the whole problem is grounded in. I have included in thesis what I argue is relevant background information that is meant to support the conclusions of the theoretical frameworks. I then make use of the international relations theory of social constructivism in order to assess the reasons for the different frames of thought and cultures and consequently their agreements. Furthermore, the theory of international relations, together with geopolitics, account for the power relations between the two state entities (I term the Exile Government of Tibet as a state entity in this matter for sake of simplicity and theoretical purpose. Realism investigates the reasons for why Tibet and China have done in relation to each other, the reasons for why they act as they do and both realism and social constructivism conclude on these finds. The theories, in support of the background information added, conclude that a solution is indeed possible, albeit perhaps not as likely as the Exile Government would hope. I explore the Middle Way Approach, a system in which Tibet would gain semi but not complete autonomy, put forth by the Dalai Lama and accepted by the Exile Government, and thesis show why China would be inclined to accept this approach, but most likely will not.           

        As far as Central Asia is concerned, this strategy of border stabilization has at the same time been translated by the concern in an initial period to resolve all of the frontier questions inherited from the Soviet era in a sense rather more favorable to the new Central Asian republics with which Beijing wished to establish good relations. On these positive foundations, China then put in place a strategy of alliance against separatism, which has gradually taken the more established form of the fight against the “three forces of evil” represented by terrorism, extremism and separatism.

               The Research urgency of the final paper lies in the fact that China – Tibet Conflict is paid little attention. This paper will investigate the causes of violent conflict in Tibet, and it will provide some recommended solutions that could potentially lead to a more peaceful and just arrangement in the region.

           Moreover, China is interested in Central Asia nature resources. With its booming economy, growing population, and relentless need for energy, China needs Kyrgyzstan for its future energy security, as well as for expanded trade and for securing its restive Xinjiang Province. So we might face the same problem as Tibet in future. This fact makes our research more urgent.

         The purpose of the final paper is to discover, analyze and investigate China – Tibet Conflict.

          The tasks of the final paper. To achieve our goal, it is required to solve the following research tasks: to study historical background of China – Tibet Conflict;

to analyze cause of national uprising in Tibet; to analyze the problem of Tibetan issue; to analyze Chinese national policy in this  region; to work out possible solutions of China – Tibet Conflict.

          My paper consists of annotation, introduction, 2 chapters, 6 paragraphs, conclusion, abbreviation list and bibliography.

            

 

 

 

 

 

 

  1. Historical Background
    1. Political and ethnical Status Quo of Tibet.

               The military invasion of People’s Republic of China constituted an aggression on a sovereign state and a violation of international law. Today's continued occupation of Tibet by China, with the help of several hundred thousand troops, represeQjs an ongoing violation of international law and of the fundamental rights of the Tibetan people to independence.

            “The Chinese Communist Government claims it has a right to "ownership" of Tibet. It does not claim this right on the basis of its military conquest in 1949 or alleged effective control over Tibet since then or since 1959. The Chinese Government also does not base its claim to "ownership" on the so-called "Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" which it forced upon Tibet in 1951 "1

            Instead, China's alleged legal claim is based on historical relationships primarily of Mongol or Manchu rulers with Tibetan lamas and, to a lesser extent, of Chinese rulers and Tibetan lamas. The main events relied on by the Chinese Government occurred hundreds of years ago: during the height of Mongol imperial expansion, when the Mongol Emperors extended their political supremacy throughout most of Asia and large parts of Eastern Europe; and when Manchu Emperors ruled China and expanded their influence throughout East and Central Asia, including Tibet, particularly in the 18th century.

           It is not disputed that at different times in its long history Tibet came under various degrees of foreign influence: that of the Mongols, the Gorkhas of Nepal, the Manchu Emperors of China and the British rulers of India. At other times in Tibet's history, it was Tibet which exercised power and influence on its neighbors, including China. It would be hard to find any state in the world today that has not been subjected to foreign domination or influence for some part of its history. In Tibet's case the degree and length of foreign influence and interference was quite limited. Moreover, relationship with the Mongol, Chinese and Manchu rulers, to the extent they had political significance, were personal in nature and did not at any time imply a union or integration of the Tibetan state with or into a Chinese state. However fascinating Tibet's ancient history may be, it's status at the time of the   Chinese invasion must, of course, be judged on the basis of its position in modern history, especially its relationship with China since 1911, when the Chinese overthrew the foreign Manchu rule and became the masters of their own country. Every country can go back to some period in history to justify territorial claims on neighboring states. That is unacceptable in international law and practice.

            The reader of China's White Paper «Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation» will be struck by the scant attention its authors pay to Tibet's modem history in the decades before 1949. This is because from 1911 to the completion of the Chinese occupation in 1951, there is no evidence of Chinese authority or influence in Tibet which can support China's claim. In fact, the preponderance of the evidence shows precisely the opposite: that Tibet was to all intents and purposes a sovereign state, independent of China. This conclusion is supported by most legal scholars and experts on the subject.2

           According to Tibetan annals, the first king of Tibet ruled from 127 BC, but it was only in the seventh century AD that Tibet emerged as a unified state and a mighty empire under Emperor Songtsen Gampo. With his rule, an era of political and military greatness and territorial expansion started that lasted for three centuries.3

 

1.2.China’s View on the Issue

        According to official Chinese sources, Tibet has been populated since before Christ. During the Tang Dynasty, Tibet was in many wars, and therefore it formed diplomatic relationships with China, to seek protection. Tibet’s ties had been closer to China, and it was during the Yuan Dynasty, founded by Kublai Khan, a grandson of Genghis Khan, that China was reunified, thus making Tibet and Yunnan officially part of China. China is a civilisation that has gone through many a transformation. This seems to be indisputable. What China would argue, however, is that during these transformations, Tibet has never been separated China. 4

       After the founding of the Republic of China (1912-1949), Tibet remained one of China's provinces. The KMT (Kuomintang) Government established an administrative body in Tibet. Together with the Mongolian and Tibetan Committee's representative office in Tibet, it maintained direct communication with China's central Government. The National Assembly of China and both chambers of parliament included Tibetans whose names have been preserved all along on official documents.5

        As the quote clearly states, when the Republic of China was formed, Tibet remained part of China. Furthermore, it kept political control with Tibet, by establishing an office in Tibet, to represent and control the region of Tibet. However, during the period of the Republic of China, there was much confusion from the West, and from Tibet, as to whether Tibet was a complete autonomous state, or belonged to China. In consequence, Tibet was running the state, as if it was an independent one. The People’s Republic of China was formed on the 1st of October in 1949 with Mao Zedong as a leader. At this time, the Tibetan Question was still under scrutiny. In extension to the new state of China, the People’s Republic of China, and in the spirit of the old, how Tibet belonged to China, the (Chinese) government announced, “that a major goal for 1950 was the liberation of Tibet”. The Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, did not, however, go as smoothly, as hoped, because: the local government of Tibet led by Regent Dagzha and the forces of pro-imperialist separatists rejected all positive approaches from the Central Government for the peaceful liberation of Tibet, and obstructed the people dispatched by the Central Government for this purpose. They alsoassembled 8,000 Tibetan troops and militia.6

          On the October 24, 1950, China did succeed in chasing the separatists away, and liberating Qamdo. China was helped by local Tibetans in that area when liberating Qamdo. After Qamdo was reunited with China, Beijing withheld forces in order to continue negotiations with the Tibetan government, so as to have the liberation be as peaceful, as possible. Eventually, it became to be so, when “the 14th Dalai Lama and the local government of Tibet eventually expressed their desire to seek a peaceful solution in January 1951”.

 

1.3.The CTA’s View on the Issue

         The origins of the Tibetan peoples may go back to an ethnic tribe “originating on the Sino-Tibetan border known to the Chinese as Qiang (Ch’iang)”. This ethnic group was supposedly pushed towards the Tibetan plateau by the peoples of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220). Official CTA sources state, however, that the history of Tibet goes back to “127 BC., with the establishment of the Yarlung dynasty”, but it was not unified until the 7th century by King Songtsen Gampo. The website then goes on to note that a ”formal peace treaty concluded between China and Tibet in 821/823 demarcated the borders between the two countries and ensured that, “Tibetans shall be happy in Tibet and Chinese shall be happy in China.””60According to this version of history, the Yarlung king expanded the territory of Tibet, and in fact succeeded in moving into Chinese territory in between several conflicts with the Chinese, where the Tibetan Empire in fact got to choose which official, albeit shortly, was to sit on the throne in China.61 In 842, however, the Tibetan Empire collapsed. “For the next four hundred years, Tibet knew no central authority.” This state of affairs continued until 1247, where the Mongol Empire had conquered China, and Sakya Pandita yielded to Godan Khan, on behalf of the Tibetan people, as he knew a Mongol conquering of Tibet and war would be the alternative. It is in this context, that the official view of the CTA is that the Mongol Empire was a world empire, not merely a Chinese one. The Mongol officials never stated, furthermore, that Tibet was under China per se, or that China and Tibet belonged together or was part of a unit. What happened then was that when the Mongol Yuan dynasty fell in 1368, the Ming would continue to rule China in Yuan’s place. The Ming’s perception was that Tibet now was part of China, and they continue to rule over Tibet, as if it was exactly that. The Ming slowly lost the interest of Tibet, and consequently its grip over it, when the threat of the Mongols passed away. It is therefore by wrong analogy, they argue, when the Chinese argue, of historical reasons, that Tibet belongs to China, since they claim that Tibet was conquered and taken. According to the account of history that the pro-CTA Tibetans will tell, Tibet was then independent up until what they would call another misunderstanding. What happened was that the Chinese of the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1912) invaded Tibet in order to expel the Mongols. The misunderstanding lies in that the Manchu understood that the Dalai Lama subjugated himself and Tibet to be under Manchu rule, whereas he in fact only opted for the same sort of relationship, as Tibet had before with the Mongol Yuan. Following the next line of years, the Manchu had established political control over Tibet and did not lose that control until foreign imperialism had caused the ties to be loosened between China and Tibet. However, at that time, the Chinese Manchu’s had already adopted a strong mind-set, that Tibet belonged to the territory of China. In the spirit of this, the following quote is enlightening: “Whatever ties existed between the Dalai Lamas and the Manchu emperors of the Qing Dynasty were extinguished with the fall of that empire and dynasty. From 1911 to 1950, Tibet successfully avoided undue foreign influence and behaved in every respect as a fully independent state.”7

       This clearly illustrates how pro-CTA Tibet does not accept the claim that Tibet belongs to China. My source, one that is biased towards supporting the position of the CTA states the following: “Since its annexation of Tibet in 1950-1951, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has denied the validity of Tibet’s right to national self-determination by construing the issue of Tibet as one entirely about class rather than nationhood”. Now, it is noteworthy at this point, to say a few words on the language in use in this phrase. According to the definition of the word “annexation” by the Encyclopaedia Britannica, annexation is:”

        A formal act whereby a state proclaims its sovereignty over territory hitherto outside its domain. Unlike cession, whereby territory is given or sold through treaty, annexation is a unilateral act made effective by actual possession and legitimized by general recognition. Annexation is frequently preceded by conquest and military occupation of the conquered territory.”8

        This language strongly implies that the author is pro the views of the CTA, sharing the attitude, that Tibet was recently independent, but then taken by China. Accepting this loaded language, however, it was at that time, that China began the invasions that would have it overtake Tibet, where the Tibetan government because of the peaceful liberation, decided to relocate the Dalai Lama to the Indian border. This was for the safety of the Dalai Lama. During this invasion, it is the case that China did not perceive it as an invasion, as some Tibetans did. The Tibetans claim that any former influence that China had had over Tibet had ceased after 1912, and in the end of the peaceful liberation, felt as if they were forced to sign the Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. However, because “the Seventeen-Point Agreement had not been approved by the Tibetan government, it required that government’s ratification”. It was then possible for China to announce to the world, not only that Tibet already belonged to China, but also that an agreement had been made; a peaceful one, that is.9

2. Analysis the problem of Tibetan issue and  the  Chinese national policy in  this  region.

2.1. Seeing each other with different ethno political approach

         Moving to the theory of Constructivism, it says, as the name implies, that there are different structures in this world, many of which are incompatible. These are essentially different ways of looking at the world, or different paradigms so to say. These paradigms depend on your cultural context, its history, ideas, etc. and it is these paradigms that will determine how you view the world of which you live in. From the introduction to the background data chapter, we pointed out that China and Tibet essentially disagree on facts. We will be investigating the cultural differences and how their worldviews are different, later, but first we will be looking at how they see each other. There appears to be a great mistrust from both sides (The Tibetans and the Chinese), where they overall see each other negatively. The Tibetans believe that the Chinese are only there to further their own financial agenda, which is to increase the revenue of the Han Chinese. The Tibetans feel that the Han Chinese are taking all the jobs in Tibet and are in fact stealing jobs from the Tibetans themselves. An increase of Chinese have moved to Tibet, which is something that Beijing have initiated in order to, officially stated, improve the economy of Tibet. The official view of Beijing then, is to increase the GDP of the Tibetan region; this is, however, not the way that many Tibetans see it. Constructivism will here explain this attitude in the way, that the Tibetans’ culture, religious views (or lack thereof), ideas, ways of life, and so forth, are different than the Chinese. The difference here means that the two parties have two different ideas of what truth constitutes and how their social reality is. The Tibetans interpret their worldview as the correct one. This means that something or someone strictly opposing what that worldview consists of, are inherently wrong (in the theory’s rough sense that is). Now, this does not necessarily mean that when someone has a different worldview than you, with different customs, that they have an evil intent when acting in such a way that affects your culture. It does mean, however, that you believe that they are in essence wrong. What this leads up to is hostility where you believe that your culture and ideas, the true ones, will be endangered by, in this case, the Chinese moving into your territory. It seems to be

the case that a reason why the Tibetans mistrust the Chinese, is in fact because they are so different; different in terms of worldviews, ideas and methods. This is one hypothesis that one can state as to why Tibetans mistrust the Chinese, where there are of course others, and as we shall see later. 10

        Realism will give a completely different account of it. The Chinese, on the other hand, see the Tibetans as lazy, backward and somewhat primitive. We know for a fact that the Chinese and their country, the Middle Kingdom, have a long history where it goes far back in history. That it has made several great inventions and contributions to the world. We know that the Han are a proud people, and that there are a great many of them. China also has a long history of receiving tribute from other surrounding states. With all this in mind, and when adding this data on the theory of Constructivism, it makes us accept the premise that the Chinese believe that their ideas together with their ways of living, is the right way of seeing the world. This in other words means that the Chinese see the Tibetan way of living as a backward and unfavourable way of living, which has to do with how the Tibetans are so much different than the Chinese. Even if it was the case that China was trying to change Tibet, so they for example would be less religious, speak Mandarin, and so forth, which has been implied as a common conception of some Tibetans, it would indeed not seem that surprising, when looking at it with the eyes of the Constructivism. The Chinese simply feel superior, and would evidently want to implement their views unto others. Until such is the case, the indication is that they feel that the Tibetans are of a lesser sort than they themselves are. The closing remarks here are fair when interpreting the theory on the facts put forth. The Dalai Lama is a person seen by some in one way and others in a different way. It is interesting to see how the Tibetans see him as a liberator, but the Chinese see him essentially as a terrorist, a liar and someone who is out to obstruct the peace and order. Constructivism tells us that the people in power have different worldviews and different cultural backgrounds, and according to Constructivism it is the cultural backgrounds that determine how things get played out in the international society. It is therefore also these people, and the institutions that they run, that determine how people view each other in an international context. This means, in other words, that if the Chinese government, who has one perspective of the subject matter is in power, it is these ideas, of system of thought, perhaps, that will control how the truth comes out in that region. The Dalai Lama and the CTA, on the other hand, have a different agenda, and they will therefore impose their truth on whomever they can, which in this case is for example some parts of the West and some parts of Tibet. These conflicting ideas by the people in power consequently determine who has the upper hand, and which views consequently gets (the most) accepted as a truth. Of convenience, we could as well add the Western perspective on the issue, which is somewhat two sided in that it both support China in that Tibet is part of it and also continuously put pressure on China in terms of human rights and the likes. All of these ideas and perceptions on how they view each other and how they view themselves depend on who is in power and where, are evidently not in agreement with each other. The question then arises, that if Constructivism explains the perceptions of state entities and organizations as grounded in and determined by, the people who hold those ideas and that these ideas are regarded as truths by the people who hold them; will they

then be able to change their minds? In other words, is it possible for China or Tibet to look at each other’s cultures as being positive or at least be regarded as equal? It shows that even though Constructivism is relativistic in terms of how people have different truths and how they see the world, people are not able to (according to Constructivism) see truth as relative, which ultimately has to do with the nature of the theory and how it explains the social world.11

 

2.2. Religion Politics.

         Tibet's earliest religion is Bon, founded by Shenrab Miwo of Shangshung in Western Tibet. With the advent of Buddhism, the Bon religion diminished in influence, but it continues to thrive today with an active community of Tibetan refugees still practising their faith in India and Nepal. Tashi Menri,

          Yungdrungling, and Khama were some of the major Bon monasteries in tibet. The Bon religion has imbibed many characteristics of Buddhism over the course of its historical development. Tibetan Buddhism, in turn, has also taken much from Bon.

         Buddhism flourished in Tibet in the seventh century. Receiving royal patronage, it spread throughout Tibet. With the assumption of power by the Dalai Lamas from 1642 onwards, the era of "harmonious blend of religion and politics" was established in Tibet. Since then, for three-and-a-half centuries, ten successive Dalai Lamas have been the spiritual and temporal rulers of Tibet.

         Monasteries, temples, and hermitages were founded in every village and town throughout Tibet, together with resident monks and, as the case may be, nuns. Every Tibetan Buddhist home had its altar. Huge monasteries, which were more like monastic cities, such as Drepung, Sera, and Gaden in Lhasa, Tashilhunpo in Shigatse, Sakya Monastery in Sakya, Tsurphu in central Tibet, Mindroling in central Tibet, Tashi-kyil in Amdo Labrang, Gaden Jampaling in Chamdo, Lithang Gonchen, etc, became high seats of learning.

         Monasteries, temples and hermitages were found in every village and town throughout Tibet. By 1959, there were a total of 6,259 monasteries and temples with about 592,558 resident monks and nuns.

        Soon after their invasion of Tibet, the Chinese authorities began to undermine the traditional social system and religion of Tibet. «Religion is the enemy of our materialist ideology and believing in religion is blind faith. Therefore, you should not only not have faith in religion, but should also condemn it, » people were told. By the middle of the fifties, monasteries, temples, and cultural centres were systematically looted and destroyed-in eastern Tibet. The physical desecration and destruction was accompanied by public condemnation of religion and humiliation and ridicule of religious persons.

         Contrary to official Chinese assertions, much of Tibet's culture and religion was destroyed between 1955 and 1961, and not during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) alone. By 1976 only eight monasteries and nunneries had escaped Chinese destructions.12

          Since 1979, some superficial religious freedom was allowed. This included selective renovation of places of worship and allowing people to indulge in rituals like prostrations, circumambulations, etc. But the propagation of the teachings of the Buddha is discouraged and strictly controlled. The essence of Buddhism lies in mental and spiritual development achieved through intensive study with qualified lamas, understanding and practice. But the Chinese authorities discourage this in their campaign to misrepresent Tibetan religion.

          Contrary to Chinese claims, most of the renovation work of the places of worship, including the "state-sponsored" ones, came through the initiative of the Tibetan public who contributed their labor and money. The assistance given by the Chinese government only forms a fraction of the total costs.

         The Chinese authorities, even now, do not let the functioning units of the monastic universities to continue their traditional religious practices. Admission to monasteries are controlled, number of monks limited and political indoctrination is undertaken in the monasteries. The management of monasteries is placed in the hands of a maze of state bureaucracies.

           Though China no longer bombs or sends Red Guards to destroy Tibet's monasteries, its aim still remains the same as before: total elimination of Tibetan religion and culture.

 

2.3. Possible future of Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR)

          Since the question here is whether China and the CTA can actually agree on a deal, it is relevant to do a thought experiment and see how Tibet might look like in the future if for example the MWA got accepted and the CTA would end up being partly autonomous, as the MWA clearly states. It is very conceivable that if that was to happen, the PRC would no longer support Tibet financially in any meaningful manner or no longer finance development of Tibet. Knowing from especially the sources supporting the PRC, Tibet was previously a region with high poverty until China came and changed that. We also know that the GDP of Tibet was significantly smaller in Tibet earlier and have in fact changed much in the recent times after the liberation of Tibet. Tibet cannot have it both ways; both be independent of China and, as well, receive support from the PRC. Even if they did, there is no reason why the PRC would continue to support Tibet in as high a manner, as they are doing now while Tibet is under China. In other words, if Tibet was to become independent of China indications are that it would have a hard time financing itself, consequently being diminished to the state of poverty that it was in before. Of course this is a pessimistic picture drawn on the possible future scenario of Tibet, if it was to achieve the independence that the CTA and some of the Tibetans long for. The other side of it, a more positive scenario, is that Tibet would succeed in building industry around many of the resources that it currently has. If this was the case, Tibet might effectively be able to make use of many of its resources, export it efficiently and export it aptly. However, to reach that point from a lower state of poverty is a hard thing to do and it is something that Tibet need help in order to do. A positive outcome of the situation then, and as we have previously indicated, a likely one as well, would be with the help of China. I mentioned here that China would most likely not continue to develop Tibet, as it is doing currently. However, earlier in the thesis I also state that China would be interested in the resources found in the Tibetan region. Taking the obvious assumption that China need and want the resources of Tibet in order to continue on its own rise and in order to continue development and trade of its own state, it is highly imaginable that on the brink of China allowing the CTA to be the new Tibetan administration, it would make sure that it (China) had special agreements with the new administration in Tibet. In other words, if Tibet were to reach independence China would make sure to have special privileges and special access to the resources of Tibet. Obviously a deal such as this has to go both ways and be mutually beneficial, and benefits to Tibet will in this scenario exist. These are benefits such as perhaps continuous support, help in building an efficient industry and perhaps business management. In an agreement such as this, China would indeed have incentives to support Tibet after a break up, since there would now be power relational benefits in it for China in the form of special trade agreements and special access to goods.13

       A possible hypothesis in this outcome is that the statement from Goldstein, that the acculturation of Tibet would be the case. I am not saying, though, that the traditional culture of Tibet would disappear completely, but more that the development of Tibet together with the massive movement of Han Chinese into Tibet would diminish it to a point where it would not pose a threat to the PRC in terms of an opposition to the PRC per se. Accepting that the hypothesis of Goldstein is in fact similar to the actual strategy of the PRC or that the consequence would be same as if it was, due to the movement of Han Chinese to Tibet in order to possess jobs, I believe it is plausible that the demonstrations and self-immolations in Tibet would diminish. In conjunction with this hypothesis, I have stated that the Dalai Lama is important for both state entities in reaching an agreement, because for the PRC he is the only legitimate authority figure. The CTA is not an authority in the eyes of the PRC because it is an illegitimate government and not one worth much attention when it does not go through the Dalai Lama first. It has been stated, however, that the Dalai Lama has retired. With this in mind, together with the obvious fact that the spiritual leader might not live forever, the CTA would lastly remain. The CTA nevertheless, does not hold much respect in the view of the PRC and the PRC would with great likelihood not be willing to negotiate with the CTA due to how it see the nature of the CTA to be, which is as a  separatist pseudo government prone to terrorism. I then believe that in this scenario, the power of the CTA is likely to diminish and the Tibet question would become less of a question.14

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Conclusion

              I have throughout the thesis explained why the CTA and China do and did as they did and what reasons they may have had for it, their incentives and made several hypotheses out of the relevant data. The question of whether or not the CTA and China can reach an agreement is one that we can now attempt to answer.

         The short answer is that they might be able to reach an agreement that they would both gain from, but that it is not that likely it will actually happen. According to the theoretical frameworks, China will not let go of the regions outside of Tibet, that Tibet wish to have as part of Tibet when/if they gained independence. I have concluded that if the CTA was to become the new administration in Tibet it would be through  the  MWA. In other words, it would be the MWA that the PRC would agree too. I argued that this approach to an agreement is the one in which China would lose the least power overall, but would still be able to have benefits from Tibet in the form of its resources and China would be able to still call Tibet part of China, and therefore not lose any integrity, due to the fact that nature of the MWA is such that Tibet does not gain complete, but only partial autonomy. I will therefore deduce that the MWA solution is the most likely solution to be realized. It is the most likely solution that both parties would agree to. However, there is an “if”. The solution would only be accepted by the PRC, and by that be realized if and only if, the Dalai Lama and the CTA changed the nature of their proposal. They would have to change the MWA so that it does not include the parts outside of Tibet, e.g. Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Ningxia as parts that they claim to want. If they changed their mind in terms of gaining that territory, the  MWA would be the most likely solution, but only if they did that.

      We can see that China’s policy is tight and focused on integration and absorption autonomous regions. The same expansive economic and demographic policy is conducted for Central- Asia republics, especially Kyrgyzstan.

      China has common history with Central Asia. In distant past, China was linked through silk route with Kyrgyzstan and entire trade with Europe, and other regions was conducted through silk route. When Islam entered in the lives of Central Asian people the whole central Asia came under Muslim rule. In those days the region was called Turkistan and also included the area which is now a province of china, in the name of Xingjian, therefore ancient ethnic and religious links exist between China and Central Asian States. Due to common borders with Kyrgyzstan spread over 100 miles the in habitants on both sides remain in close contact.

       In the present circumstances, the role of china may remain unpredictable but it is most probable that China will be most important player in Kyrgyzstan in future. Since the independence of  Kyrgyzstan in 1991 China has built close bilateral trade and investment connections to create and increase its sphere of influence.

        So, to avoid the same problem as Tibet in future, Kyrgyzstan has to raise own economy and aim to be subject of own foreign and domestic policy, not to be an object of political influence of China and other strong power.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abbreviation List

 

CTA – Central Tibetan Administration

IGO – Intergovernmental Organisation

IR – International Relations

PRC – People’s Republic of China

MWA – Middle Way Approach

TAR – Tibet Autonomous Region

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

  1. Baylis, John and Smith, Steve: “The Globalization of World Politics – an Introduction to International Relations”; Oxford University Press; New York; 2006.
  2. Blouet, Brian W.: “Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century – Second Revised and Expanded Edition”; Reaktion Books; London; 2010.
  3. Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East GateBook; United States of America; 2006.
  4. He, Baogang: “The Dalai Lama’s Autonomy Proposal – A one-Sided Wish?” “, in Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June;
  5. Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006.
  6. Jacques, Martin: When China Rules the World – the Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World; Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin Books; England; 2009.
  7. Mearsheimer, John J: “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”; University of Chicago, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.; New York; 2001.
  8. Smith Jr., Warren W.: “China’s Tibet? – Autonomy or Assimilation”; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; United States of America; 2008.
  9. John K. Fairbank: ”China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No.3, (Apr., 1969)
  10. Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June: “Introduction – the Tibet Question in Contemporary Perspective”, in Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006.
  11. Teufel Dreyer, June: “Economic Development in Tibet Under the People’s Republic of China“, in Sautman, Barry in Teufel Dreyer, June; Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006.

1 Jacques, Martin: When China Rules the World – the Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World; Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin Books; England; 2009. – P. 32

2 Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006.- P. 12

3 He, Baogang: “The Dalai Lama’s Autonomy Proposal – A one-Sided Wish?” “, in Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June 2011. – P. 23

4 Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East GateBook; United States of America; 2006. – P. 45

5 Blouet, Brian W.: “Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century – Second Revised and Expanded Edition”; Reaktion Books; London; 2010. – P.87

6 Mearsheimer, John J: “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”; University of Chicago, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.; New York; 2001. – P. 39

7 Baylis, John and Smith, Steve: “The Globalization of World Politics – an Introduction to International Relations”; Oxford University Press; New York; 2006.- P.91

8 Smith Jr., Warren W.: “China’s Tibet? – Autonomy or Assimilation”; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; United States of America; 2008. – P. 45

9 John K. Fairbank: ”China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No.3, (Apr., 1969). – P. 27

10 Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June: “Introduction – the Tibet Question in Contemporary Perspective”, in Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006. – P. 56

11 Teufel Dreyer, June: “Economic Development in Tibet Under the People’s Republic of China“, in Sautman, Barry in Teufel Dreyer, June; Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006. – P. 38

12 Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006. – P. 48

13 Jacques, Martin: When China Rules the World – the Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World; Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin Books; England; 2009. – P. 76

14 Blouet, Brian W.: “Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century – Second Revised and Expanded Edition”; Reaktion Books; London; 2010. – P. 95