Demonization of Chechens by Russian media and its impact on the opinion of international society

Demonization of Chechens by Russian media and its impact on the opinion of international society 

Introduction

Russo-Chechen relations have started long time ago and they always had some troubles. In nineteenth-century, Russian poets and novelists presented Chechnya in a romanticized way, portraying Chechen people both as lone and noble fighters, and as ‘savages’. So what has happened to an image of Chechens? Nowadays the only association which comes to people’s mind with Chechen is- “terrorist”. The aim of my dissertation is to analyze how and why Russian media did have played its role in changing people’s opinions toward Chechnya and Chechens and what stands behind it.

Media turns out to be a great mobilizing and fighting force in modern conflicts. This is the same combat resource as tanks and artillery, as with television and press such goals as recruitment and morale of soldiers and the public, including international support for the conflicting parties, can be achieved. In today’s world, in the era of global information technology, media have become a powerful weapon in the management of armed conflicts. As to Tishkov: “Nowadays it is virtually impossible to organize a conflict without media, and it has long been one of the front lines of conflict”. (Tishkov V., 1994) Media have the power to inflate or reduce the flames of conflicts in their reports. This section will provide some theoretical background, such as ethical stereotyping in media. V. Tishkov’s article are used to describe how does stereotyping in media work and A. Minkin’s opinion that Russian government needed to create an enemy in media, in order to hide economic and social problems will be analyzed.

The Chechen crisis has exposed the problems of media coverage related to ethno-political conflict, especially in the phase of fighting. Modern domestic journalism, as well as Russian society as a whole, have been brought up under a totalitarian regime, the communist ideology, and were not ready to play a role, which media suppose to play in a democratic society. The level of freedom of press can be measured during any crisis. In this regard, the war in Chechnya has put some serious questions about the ability of authorities to comply with the principles of openness of information and willingness of the media to act objectively under extreme conditions. The question is not if the information which is transmitted positive or negative, but in fact, that the main evaluation criterion of the media in a democratic society is a test for accuracy and completeness of the information provided. In this section, the relationship between media sources and Russian government will be presented through the analysis of first Chechen war. The behavior of Russian media representatives will be analyzed from different perspectives, such as Ovsepyan’ and Grabelnikov’s. 

During the Chechen conflict it has become clear that free and independent media that reflect and protect the interests of civil society in Russia has not yet been formed. First of all this is due to an oligarchic system of power operating in Russia, a strong bias of the Russian mass media by the various political forces. This is also reinforced by the fact that Russian society at the present time was in the transition state from socialism to wild capitalism, so there were practically no clear moral and ethical guidelines related to the civilized norms of interethnic communication. Another important factor is an absence of real legal norms and mechanisms of ethnicity and journalism, which also promotes political engagement of the media. Here it will be discussed how media in Russia is still under control of a government, in a case of second Chechen campaign. O. Panfilov’s book on informational blockade of Chechnya will help to understand what factors helped Russian government to change the way Chechen conflict was broadcasted.

Media diplomacy will lead to the question of how did covering of Chechen conflict affected the opinion of international society and what role did media play in demonizing the Chechen population. Finally, the image of Chechen nowadays will be presented and compared to the one which was promoted in the first Chechen war.  
 

Ethical stereotypes of media in Chechen conflict

A special role in covering conflicts is played by generated by journalists and reporters images and stereotypes of the conflicting parties.

Ethnic stereotypes-is a relatively stable view of moral, intellectual and physical qualities, inherent in members of different ethnic communities. The contents of ethical stereotypes include fixed value judgments about these qualities. Ethnic stereotypes can be divided into autostereotypes and heterostereoypes. Autostereotypes are opinions, judgments, assessments, belonging to this ethnic community by its representatives. Usually, autostereotypes include positive ratings. Heterostereotypes, i.e. the set of value judgments about other people, can be either positive or negative, depending on the historical experience of the interaction of these people. (Rösch O., 1998) The content of ethnic stereotypes should distinguish between the relatively stable core, which is a set of ideas about the appearance of representatives of the ethnic group through their historical past, features of life and job skills, and a number of volatile judgments about communicative and moral qualities of people. “The adequacy of the contents of ethnic stereotypes is actually quite problematic. Rather, we should assume that ethnic stereotypes reflect the past and present, positive or negative experience of relations between nations, especially in those areas (such as trade, agriculture, etc.) where these people were most actively contacted”. (Arutyunyan, Drobizheva and Susokolov, 1999:126)

The Chechen conflict has shown how huge is a role of media in creation and printing of stereotypes. The war in Chechnya was going not only on battlefields, but also in the fields of newspapers’ and magazines’ pages, radio and television. Informative warfare (which was admittedly won by Dudayev and Udugov during the first Chechen campaign) was largely a “war of stereotypes”. 

In order to counter the tendentious coverage of issues in resolving the Chechen conflict by Russian and foreign media and strengthen the democratic foundations of the Russian Federation, Russian news agencies were supposed to show that the Russian statehood have an incorrigible enemy in the face of disloyal Chechens.

Media has formed a negative image of Chechen people, by creating an image of a criminal nation, making Russian people dislike them as the main force, which is destroying Russian statehood. The media actively promoted and shaped the frightening image of a “person of Chechen nationality”. Russian man had a chance to see pictures of the “Chechen life” every day on TV screen”- a religious fanatic, a psycho-thriller, flaunting with his “exploits”, leaders of terrorists, threatening to incinerate Russia. Barsukov, a former director of the FSB has made a statement during an operation to release hostages in Kizlyar, captured by S. Raduyev and his fighters. He said: “Chechen terrorism is now beyond the territory of Chechnya. It is almost impossible to find a person who would say something good about Chechens in Russian cities and villages. All Chechen can do is to be a bandit.” (Informational war in Chechnya, 1997:555)  

“Chechen trail” has become the basic version of the Russian secret services to investigate the circumstances of not only explosions and terrorist attacks, but also the assassinations, which have become an everyday phenomenon in Russian reality. Some people from Russian government said, that a residential block of flats, blown up by terrorists in August of 1999 on the Kashir highway, was “Chechen terrorism”. Although there was no single Chechen in the lists of suspects and wanted later, in the minds of Russians Chechens were to blame for the bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk. “So, Chechen war came to Moscow not in tragic scenes of explosions, but as a reincarnation of anti-Chechen phobias in the phase of “the Chechen war is everywhere”. Instead of realizing that the situation in Chechnya is the all-Russian problem and it can only be solved by joint efforts (cannot be solved only by the Chechens, but also needs their participation in it), Russian society adopts an image of Chechens as a threat associated with internal conflict, which grew into a destructive war”. (Tishkov V., 2001:50)

Media reports from Chechnya are dominated by image of men with guns. Grinning and wild image of a “Highlander” (i.e. Chechen) has been imposed to Russian and international community. According to Alexander Minkin, “It is clear that the government needed another enemy (enemy is a necessary component of Russian life today, and this role is assigned to the Chechens). Without this, it would be difficult to explain why 60% of Russians live below the poverty line, because the discontent of people is a real force. So it is better to direct this force against Chechens, rather than regional and city committees and Kremlin, where governors disadvantage wages and raise the rent”. (Minkin A., 1995:275)

Another stereotype of the war in Chechnya was so-called Russian-Chechen confrontation that lasts for “more than two hundred years”. Some journalists and politicians, use media to deliberately impose Russian man the idea that Chechens are a warlike people, accustomed to live in a combat environment, who are being prepared for war from infancy, too freedom-loving to coexist peacefully with Russia. It gives a thought, that they are historically the “destroyers of the empire”. Thus Chechen people are being pushed beyond the “civilized” nations.

The collapse of the USSR and the armed conflicts erupted in the post-Soviet space have shown that Russian media were ill-prepared for objective coverage of the conflict. “Russian (post-Soviet) journalism carries a ‘generic spot’  of the Bolshevik press: it is dominated not by reporting, but by evaluation-edification. Every report of Russian media is “editorial” and every journalist is a “judge”. (Tishkov V., 1994)

Another reason for the poor coverage of the conflict is the issue of training of journalists and editors. The journalists often do not know any history, or the cause of the conflict, sometimes they do not know anything about the mentality and culture of inhabitants of the region involved in conflict and only judge from prevailing stereotypes about ethnic groups.  
 

First Chechen war: Media vs. government

Even in relation to the events of 1993, it cannot be said that the authorities had an unconditional support of the “democratic” media. Despite the existence of subsidies, the relationship between the government and the press at the dawn of the second republic were more of a partnership.

This partnership was primarily due to the fact that the leadership of the “democratic” publications supported the policy of democratic market reforms, as well as taking anti-communist positions. Press owed its very existence (popularity, influence and the privatization of media of course) to the new political regime.

In the early 90s press perceived itself as the “fourth estate”, as an independent public institution. Editors and journalists felt their responsibility to society and believed that the press can and should criticize government when it makes mistakes. (Zasursky I., 1999)

Alliance between the press and the government was destroyed after Boris Yeltsin has started the war in Chechnya. From the perspective of Russian press and the “democratic”  press, which had previously supported the president, commercial media and especially the opposition press (except for national patriotic publications like the newspaper “Zavtra” (“Tomorrow”), the war in Chechnya was quite a dull and pointless idea.

No matter how mythological was the system of values of the “democratic” press, in the case of Chechnya it cannot be accused of being unprincipled. Ideals of the second republic, the journalists assumed, were not compatible with the war, especially civil, because the main task of democracy is to overcome the war through open political processes. Chechen war, as well as Afghan war at the time, has started behind the scenes-the reasons were not explained and necessity was not proved. The public and the press could only guess what has become a real reason for a war to take place. When Russian press and TV realized that their position has not led to any change in the policy of authorities it faced a serious dilemma. Either it had to accept the supreme authority of the president, bordering on the dictatorship, thus recognizing that this dictatorship was established with the help of the “democratic” press and TV. Another way was to show this “democratic” press still can really influence government policy and the dictatorship has turned to be enlightened.

As a result “Izvestiya”, “Komsomolskaya Pravda”, “Argumenty I Fakty”, “Moskovsky Komsomolets” and Russian state television RTR and NTV replaced their loyalty to the president for his sharp opposition. Loyalty was retained only by the first channel “Ostankino” and “Russkaia Gazeta”.

The literature on the history of media in Russia has two dramatically opposite views on the development of the conflict in Chechnya and its coverage in the media. Events in Chechnya were perceived in society ambiguously. Official sources kept silent about the heavy losses of Russian army and internal forces in fights with Chechen armed groups. Mass media started to use its right of publicity; they first started talking about what was hidden from people. Reports on television and radio, in numerous newspaper articles were telling the truth about the heavy fighting and how young and poorly trained soldiers were killed. From the first days of war in Chechnya, Russian citizens used media to protest the bloodshed. In 1996, this protest has been significantly increased. All the media reported about a truly mass action held by the Governor Nemtsov of Nizhny Novgorod region- he presented million signatures, demanding to stop the war in Chechnya. The press had every reason to claim that the war in Russia today is more than unpopular, that country does not need bloodshed, which meant that it was time to end the war. (Ovsepyan R., 1996:100-101).

Another look at the history of developments in Chechnya was presented by Grabelnikov in his book. In the section called “A Destabilizing nature of modern media” he defines this historic episode as a “rare event in the history of journalism, when the national enemy sided with the enemy during the war”. (Grabelnikov A., 1996:67-69)

The Chechen crisis showed that the “fourth power” may be executive, as well as legislative and judicial. Rather than reflecting public opinion, some media started to create it.  

The Chechen conflict made significant changes in the opposition between different media representatives. “Democratic” publications massively “attacked” governmental newspaper “Rossiyskaya Gazeta”. This happened because unlike other newspapers, including patriotic and communist, it has supported actions of president and federal forces to defeat Dudayev’s fighters. “Moskovsky Komsomolets” stated that the whole nation condemned the situation in Chechnya and only “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” opposed the entire nation. (Grabelnikov A., 1996:56).  

According to Grabelnikov, massive processing of public opinion by the media has become so obvious and intolerable to the army, that soldiers appealed to the President, the Prime Minister, Chairman of the Duma, Defence Minister with a statement, in which they outlined their difficult situation. They were confronting gangs of professional killers, at the same time dealing with media, which was opposing the strengthening of Russian statehood. Under the support of unscrupulous politicians, pulling out particular words from the speeches of army command and falsification the facts and events, some representatives of Russian media misinformed the public, deliberately aggravating the political situation in the country and undermining Russia’s prestige on the international arena. (Grabelnikov A., 1996:72-73).

With the same zeal with which the press earlier defended the reform policy, it discredited an image of president as a national leader and reported in details about the incompetent military campaign in Chechnya and numerous victims among the soldiers. However, the position of the media community was not unified, as some reporters expressed less unambiguous and anti-war point of view.  

Informational blockade of Chechnya (2 Chechen War)

The situation with covering of the situation in Chechnya has changed dramatically after the Russian forces began second military operation on the territory of the republic. Analytical articles about Chechen war have almost disappeared from the state media. After the adoption of Law “On Combating Terrorism”  called counterterrorist, only NTV television, “Ekho Moskvy” radio station and few Moscow newspapers have tried to report about might happen outbreak of war and how another military action of Russian authorities will turn out.

With the outbreak of war, the content of regional newspapers has changed completely. Only some of them published editorials and articles of analytical observers, which contained more question, but there were almost no answers.

Second Chechen war was preceded by preparation of a new information policy. Military analysts and experts began to circulate through media views, which were supposed to justify the restrictions imposed for journalists by Kremlin. On the 7^th of October of 1999, “Kommersant” newspaper has published an article called “The new information policy of the General Staff is immediately out of date”, in which the relationship between military leadership in Chechnya and media is analyzed. As the paper wrote, “soon after the end of first Chechen war, former chief of group of federal forces, Colonel General Leonti Shevtsov admitted: “I now realize that it is impossible to win the war without information support. We should be friends with press”. According to “Kommersant”, Chief of General Staff Anatoly Kvashin had personally forbidden to indulge the representatives of independent media in Mozdok. Employees of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense and officials of the General Staff of the Russian army were not allowed to directly communicate with journalists by the Minister of Defense. (Kommersant, 1999)

As an example of new information policy has become a meeting which took place on the 25^th of May in 2000, where Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov met the leaders of major media sources in Moscow. The press was presented by the state agency ITAR-TASS and RIA “Novosti”, state television companies ORT and RTR , the independent media- “Interfax” agency, NTV, “Kommersant”, “Moscovskiye Novosti” (Moscow News), “Pravda” (True), “Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts), “Komsomol’skaya Pravda”, “Segodnia” (Today) and “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” (Independent Newspaper). The meeting was also attended by the Minister for Press Michael Lessin, and some other government authorities. The topic of conversation was the events in Chechnya. (Panfilov O., 2005)

 This meeting has established not only the state’s monopoly on information about Chechnya, but also gave state officials a right to be engaged in propaganda, which was a dissemination of false information leading to a distortion of real events in Chechnya.

Government officials also used propaganda during the first military campaign, but with the outbreak of second war, distributed information had no any logic or common sense. Official sources did not care about the fact, that the information they spread was refuted or looked rather ridiculous even for people without any military experience.

The most popular topic of interviews of officials during the second campaign was the announcement of the end of the war. For example, on the 26^th of June, 2000, Commander of the Joint Groups of Russian Forces in Chechnya, General Gennady Troshev said that “the war as such on the territory of Chechnya is complete”. He also said that military “is not acting offensive, does not cause air and artillery strikes”. However, same day the agency “Interfax” and the Agency of military news spread the message that “for past 24 hours, there were 11-12 flights made by combat aircraft Su-25, two flights on aerial reconnaissance and more than 30 sorties of helicopters. (Panfilov O., 2005)  

Image of an enemy in media covering the Chechen conflict.

Covering the Chechen conflict, Russian media have taken different positions: one group was justifying Chechen resistance movement (explaining it as a struggle for freedom, independence, etc.), while others were defending the official position of Russian government (Chechnya is an integral part of Russia, so armed groups are illegal and must be destroyed), and the third group (the smallest) tried to cover the conflict from the centrist position, not taking one side. These differences in coverage of the conflict are explained by the different positions of specific media, since they represent interests of distinct social groups of population.

“An important feature in covering events in Chechnya was the transformation of the positions of various media at certain stages of the conflict. During the first Chechen campaign (1994-96) most of the media treated Chechen resistance movement with sympathy and often carried reports on their side. However, during the counter-terrorist operation, which started in 1999, almost all of the media justified it, as a need to protect Russia against the threat posed by Chechnya, which became the basis of international terrorism”-writes professor J. Gakayev. (Gakayev J., 2001:82)

Images of Chechens were constantly transformed in journalist reports. In first Chechen war, citizens carrying out armed actions in illegal armed groups were known as militias. From 1996 until the beginning of the antiterrorist operation in 1999, an image of the enemy took a form of “Wahhabi”-a bearded armed man, with fanatical sight. Since the beginning of the second Chechen campaign and especially after the USA has announced the “war on terror”, Chechen armed groups were more often called “international terrorists”.

By the beginning of the counterterrorist campaign in summer of 1999, public opinion in Russia entirely supported government and the military. Basayev’s raid into Dagestan and explosions in the cities of Russia made public to have a supportive opinion about military option in solving Chechen problem. Second Chechen war was preceded by an unprecedented anti-Chechen campaign by Russian media, due to terrorist attacks in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Makhachkala, in which hundreds of civilians were killed. Since then all Chechens were the prime suspects and defendants a priori. For about two years Russian audience and readers has been shown and told what kind of society has been built by Chechens, a society, where slave trade and taking hostages for ransom seemed to be normal. Footage of torture and humiliation of hostages, shooting of people in Grozny, threats of terrorists attacks from militant leaders-all these factors played an important role in making Russian society to be ready to start another massacre to destruct these “bad people”.

As it was written in “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” (Independent Newspaper): “It is noteworthy that this time is more favorable than in December of 1994. Today, public opinion in Russia itself, as well as in the world, prepared for war campaign by the media. If during 1994-96, journalist reports about Russian troops’ barbarity invaded in all the media, in a case of new war, Chechens can meet an information blockade, as not many reporters would dare to work on the territory, where some of their colleagues were kept as hostages and where slave trade is actually legalized”. (Rotar I., 1999) (Ротарь И. Кто стоит за сепаратистами?// Независимая газета от 15.09.99) The authorities and the military introduced a very strict censorship on information from the conflict zone.  

Nowadays, the most terrifying image of Chechen terrorist is a woman, to be more specific, “Black Widow”. In order to understand why this image is so frightening, it is important to analyze who is the “black widow”.   It was assumed that black widows are Chechen women whose husbands were killed during the war. They can be characterized as “women who, having lost their men, have also lost their raison d’être, and seek revenge.”  (Sjoberg L. & Gentry C.E., 2007:100). These female suicide bombers were not only technically efficient blasting agents, but they have also become a terrifying symbol of death incarnate. Several dozen black widows have committed acts of terror, mainly in Moscow. Their actions have claimed hundreds of lives. The phenomenon of black widows has been studied by Russian psychologist and professor Krasnov, who wrote: “Ideologists of Chechen separatism try hard to create and promote the image of a desperate widow, avenging her husband’s death. But in practice most of the young women suicide terrorists are not widows. However, it is true that often some of their both close and distant relatives have died or disappeared. This is important in the development of a psychological readiness to terrorist actions, but alone is probably not sufficient. What is also needed is for these immediate or recent losses to be linked with the long term ethnocultural perception that these are insults that require a response, invariably a violent response-in other words revenge”. (Krasnov (2005:108).

Typical scenario of how a woman becomes a “black widow” is this: a young woman experiencing a psychological crisis or prolonged frustration, passing into depression. At some point, experienced guides isolate her from external contacts. After that, these women have usually been gathered together and moved to a remote village where they were subjected to a systematic effects of religious rituals, endless reading of verses from the Qur’an and persistent reminder of the need for revenge to the enemy. Sometime later they become entirely subordinate to their mentors. Next step is the practical training in the craft of terror, such as the use weapons, explosives and search for targets. The last stage of training usually takes place close to the intended object of attack.

Obviously, it is impossible to reject the fact, that these women had real reasons to retaliate the Russian government. Some of the women have been raped by Russian soldiers and at least one of the arrested terrorists was pregnant. But taking in an account all real and imagined grievances, they could not make a systematic terror without the presence of a well-constructed institution and the system created specifically for this purpose and which was designed to sow terror in Russian society, but this kind of terror was soon drowned either due to lack of women (it should be noted, that such acts on the part of women is completely contrary to Islam, and even more so, Chechen traditions), or on grounds of inefficiency of the method.

Nevertheless, most of the serious terrorist attacks which happened recently were carried out by Chechen women, so called “Black Widows”. As Ramzan Kadyrov,

vice premier of the Russian-backed Chechen government said in his interview to

Chechen TV on May 11, 2005, “Chechen women are the most dangerous for national

security because they have carried out the most risky operations. If the current trend

continues, Chechen female bombers will continue to be a grave threat to Russian

national security.” (Speckhard A.&Akhmedova K., 2006:76)  

Media diplomacy

Media diplomacy is directly related to the transformation of traditional diplomatic processes. According to E. Gilboa, diplomacy is a system of communication, through which government officials express and protect the interests of their countries, talking about their decisions and ultimatums. (Gilboa E., 1998) Diplomatic communication process reveals the positions of officials and political levels of states, often conducted with a goal to enlist the support of other actors on the international stage. During the 20^th century, diplomacy consisted of private from the public procedures. At the end of the twentieth century diplomacy was transformed into an open process that involves the media and the international community, which was due to democratization, with active participation of the masses in political processes, as well as technological advances in the field of communication and the globalization of electronic journalism. 

Media diplomacy plays a critical role in the political process and it cannot be underestimated. In this sense, Russia is one of the best example how can society be manipulated with the help of media. State leaders and diplomats today often use global television to broadcast to announce their decisions. The goal of global television news is to fully inform about the various political, social and cultural processes in the world to provide an opportunity for the world leaders to speak, even including opposition ones.

There are few format features of global news networks, in particular the breaking news and ongoing coverage of crises under special headings on the screen, such as “America at war” or “Middle East crisis” involve three groups involved in international policy for example. Editors are constantly demanding new details from reporters from the scene, reports encourage the leaders to quickly respond and comment on the events, leaders are asking experts and diplomats to analyze what is happening and to make recommendations. (Gilboa E., 2002:6).  

A reality of our world today can be described by the words of Friedrich Nietzsche: “You shall love peace as a means to new wars”. Messages about the wars and armed conflicts in the world occupy the news first. Primarily, it happens due to the fact that conflicts of all kind-international, regional and local are now almost the biggest problem in today’s world. During the period from 1989 to 1994 94 conflicts were identified and only four of them were interstate. (Petrovskiy V., 2000)

Despite the transition of many countries on ‘the democratic track’ the number of ethnic conflicts, often associated with nationalism and separatism, has increased. Today the threat of large-scale international wars exists.

Ways of covering wars and armed conflicts on the TV cause a lot of debates among researchers and mass media journalists. There are several approaches to this problem. (Orlova V., 2003)

The first approach to the coverage of the conflict is intended to strengthen public opinion against one of the parties involved. This sometimes has been practically realized by the global television networks, especially in the case of the Chechen war. For example, reports of CNN International and BBC World in the period from December 1999 to March 2000 were focused on the refugee issue, and included numerous interviews with people affected by the federal forces, thus creating an image of illegal policy of Russian authorities with regard to Chechnya. Journalists of global television networks were not looking for an explanation of the true causes of armed conflict and therefore could not objectively assess the problem. The lack of analytical data in the reports also reflected on the quality of reporting on Chechnya.

Quite often the television networks follow the second method of covering the conflict and representing the views of the two conflicting parties. Thus, to discuss some particular problem in the global TV network broadcast representatives of both sides are invited. This is one of the most promising ways to cover conflicts, because the causes of conflicts, in fact, are often reduced to a significant difference in ideologies and viewpoints. Rejection of the opinion of opposition parties leads to more failure in the relationship, the impression that one side suppressing and oppressing another (Indians and Pakistanis, Israelis and Palestinians, Hutus and Tutsis, Serbs and Croats). Listening and understanding different points of view is an opportunity, which is given by a global television. Though, it should be noted that in reality it is extremely difficult to achieve mutual understanding between the opposition parties and even harder is to remain an impartial channel in the eyes of parties.    

Requirements for image processing while covering the war are quite severe. However, self-censorship of journalists is a priority. One of the main concepts of “visual”  broadcast during military conflicts and disasters of CNN, BBC World and Euronews is based on gentle and sympathetic attitude toward the audience. For example, scenes of violence and images of dead bodies do not usually appear without a good reason, because TV networks avoid showing the dismal consequences of shootings and accidents. Such images have very strong impact on the audience, which can include children. Severe restrictions on the displaying and demonstrating violence have a strong reason, because reduce of sensitivity of the audience, desensitization are not allowed.    

On the 28^th of September, 1999 CNN International has showed a tape, where Chechen aims in the head of a captured Russian soldier, but suddenly shoots another prisoner. First time the material was shown, it was not edited by CNN and almost the whole story was on the news. Next time it was shown edited with scenes of murder being cut out. (Laredo Morning Times, 1999). Motivations of journalists are clear: they had a unique video and it is hard to resist the desire to show it in its entirety. However, the demonstration of violence does not fit into the concept of a global broadcast TV.

The visual aspect of conflict is particularly important, because it is most strongly reflected in the mass audience perception of events. Researchers claim that the perception of conflict is largely stereotyped and involves an emotional reaction to a feeling of hostility to one side and a cognitive aspect-the desire to simplify the information, a schematic assessment of the facts, selective perception. (Lebedeva M., 1997:49).

The stereotypical perception of the information depends on the approach to the coverage of conflicts by the media.TV reporters are in a very difficult position- they need to report in tight time frames, which can cause troubles in presenting a complete picture of this conflict. Techniques, such as schematization of the conflict, usually with a friend or foe method, creating an image of an enemy-any action of the opposition are presented to be intentional and malicious. (Lebedeva M., 1997:49-50) are primarily being used by politicians and journalists tend to avoid them, but it does not always work. Correspondents of the opposition parties very often assess conflict from the different perspective and reflect it diametrically opposite. Ideally it is necessary to inform the audience about the interests of both sides.  

The question of the necessary inspection and filtering of information was relevant and while covering the war and anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya. Armed conflict in Chechnya is one of the most difficult subjects in analysis of global networks. Western journalists faced a real problem of obtaining accurate official information and the difficulty of access to Chechnya. Such secrecy has contributed to the fact, that global television had limited material and often used films shot by Chechen separatists, which was evidence not in favor of federal troops.

BBC’s World correspondent Robert Parsons noted that it was much harder to work during the anti-terrorist operation, than during the first Chechen war. However during the second Chechen war they had an opportunity to freely communicate with the fighting troops and officers, with the civilian population who suffers most in war. Their stories were absolutely not coinciding with the information that journalists have received from various news services. It is worth noting that problems with access to all necessary information in time of war are the same for all initiators of force. (BBC, 1999)

Coverage of the Chechen military campaign was accompanied by inadequate assessment and lack of facts, as well as one-sided interpretation of the conflict. CNN covered the first Chechen war and later anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya more harshly than the BBC. Here is an example: on the 22^nd of October of 1999 CNN International BBC World reported the death of about one hundred residents of Grozny after an explosion at the central market of Chechen capital. Russian authorities denied any involvement to an explosion in the beginning, but then took a responsibility, saying that the market was a warehouse of weapons of the militants. After receiving this material, CNN gave a special news release. Steve Harrigan was broadcasting live from Moscow, he commented on the images, saying that massive counter-terrorist war affects the civilian population. While he was saying this, they have been showing pictures of killed people. (CNN International: Breaking News, 1999) in Orlova V. (2003)

BBC World News after an emergence release on the event immediately invited experts to comment on the situation. Jane Sharpe spoke to the host of the news program, who had also conducted a teleconference with the political analyst from Oxford. The debate also included the problem of discrimination against Caucasians in Russia. Responding to sharp criticism of Russian authorities relating to infringement of interests of ethnic minorities in South Russia and anti-Semitic attitudes in society, Jane Sharp said that it is important not to jump to conclusions, because West has already did a lot of mistakes in judging about this country during the “Cold War” and that they might not be able to adequately assess a complex situation in Russia. (BBC World: Europe Direct, 1999) in Orlova V. (2003).  
 
 

 Conclusion

One of the features of covering the counter-terrorist campaign was a so-called confrontation between Russian and Western media. Russian journalists are working with the federal troops, while foreign correspondents are trying to get information from insurgents. However, neither Russian nor Western reader can get a coherent picture, but journalists are getting involved in the information war. Russian-Chechen conflict is seen and evaluated very differently depending on the observer’s position. For a Russian man, it is a central political conflict of the country.

Western media calls the Russian-Chechen conflict a “forgotten war”. In the long list of local conflicts this war bears no comparison. Western media reports about the losses of Russian troops from time to time and sometimes reminiscent of the hardships and privations of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Chechnya, but the interest in this war falls until any sensational act of terrorism happens. This decline of interest in the Chechen war and the sharp contrast between the Russian and the world public opinion to assess the importance of this conflict has deep foundations, especially noticeable, if aware of the significant difference the position of Western government and the polyphony of public opinion.

In contrast to the government of the world, public opinion on Chechen conflict in recent years has developed a range of positions, rather differing between themselves. In case of Chechnya, a variety of positions and opinions about the Chechen crisis weakened the opportunity for public opinion to influence the government, allowing them to step aside and pursue a policy of complete non-interference. The war in Chechnya has become an important factor in a reduction of trust to Russian leadership by centrist and moderate-right groups in Europe and America, who adhere to liberal-democratic orientation. The difficulties which Russian government has experienced in its relations with Chechnya were met in the West with full understanding. Whatever the temporizing policy used by Yeltsin administration in relation to Chechen separatism in early years meant, such policy gave and impression of a sharp break with the theory and practice of Soviet policy and so was viewed as a conclusive evidence of Russia’s move toward democratization.

Armed intervention in Chechnya, its rapid collapse and protracted war have noticeably changed the attitude of the liberal-democratic groups in the West towards the Russian political elite and the Russian society in general. In Western liberal-democratic circles there is a fairly clear understanding that the war in Chechnya casts Russia back, delaying its modernization and limiting Russia’s ability to participate in international politics. No one in the West wants this war to continue and its completion would have been greeted with general satisfaction. But watching the way the war was waged and most importantly, seeing the failure of Russia’s political class to end it, liberal-democratic forces came to the conclusion that this war is a smaller evil. The war has highlighted the following characteristics of the Russian political elite such as backwardness, ignorance, inability to long-term production of contamination problems and ravings about an existence of a special Russian path of development.

Since childhood, people from developed democratic countries learn a simple idea that the greatness and influence of the state is determined not only by its geographical size and military strength, but with indicators of economic well-being, cultural level, the quality of education, health and general living standards, however it is not yet a strong characteristic of the Russian mass consciousness.

The paradox of the Russian-Chechen war is that on the one hand, it strengthens the confidence of Western world that Russia’s elite, for their backwardness and lack of understanding the results of their actions, or in effort to get to talk about themselves and strengthen their albeit wrong impact in the world events may be tempted to continue the traditional policy of confrontation with West and create a suicidal, but an extremely unpleasant for Western authorities alliance with the East and countries of Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, the continuing war with Chechnya provides a temporary guarantee that such a script has a little chance to be realized. In this sense, for all the negative consequences of the Russian-Chechen war, such as human rights violation and the slowdown of Russian democratization and transition to a market economy, this conflict is seen as time-winning by liberal-democratic forces and Western governments.

Chechen war in West seems to be ethnic-Russian against Chechens, and imperial-a huge Russia against a small nation of mountaineers. Nothing is said about the ethnic composition of Chechnya and about how different people coexist in Caucasus. Kara-Murza concluded that the Chechen tragedy in Russia, according to Western media is a “well-contested spectacle. Actors are Yeltsin and Dudayev, Shakhrai and Kovalev, Vlinton and Le Carre, does not seem to relate to each other, each playing his own role, but following the same invisible conductor’s baton”. (Kara-Murza S., 1995:3)       
 
 
 

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